Logical Revisionism: Logical Rules vs. Structural Rules
1 : Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques
(IHPST)
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Website
Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, CNRS : UMR8590, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris
13 Rue du four 75006 PARIS -
France
According to semantic antirealism, intuitionistic logic satisfies the requirement that truth should be constrained by provability in principle. Some philosophers have argued that semantic antirealism must be committed to effective provability and that the commitment leads to a stronger kind of logical revisionism exemplified by substructural logics.
I shall take into account two different kinds of reply. The first rests on the idea that if we have a method which may be used over some surveyable range, we have determined a way of applying the method everywhere in principle, and that this is enough as far as fixing or grasping meaning is concerned. The second concerns two radical antirealist principles disqualifying structural rules: Token Preservation and Preservation of Local Feasibility.
I shall argue that conceptual support may be provided for both and that the criticism of invalid introduction and elimination rules provides the stronger revision.
